A novel blind signature scheme and its variations based on DLP by Sukhadarshini, Shubhanwita
A Novel Blind Signature Scheme And Its Variation
Based on Discrete Logarithm Problem
A thesis submitted in partial fulllment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Technology
in
Computer Science and Engineering
(Specialization: Information Security)
by
Shubhanwita Sukhadarshini
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
National Institute of Technology Rourkela
Rourkela, Orissa, 769 008, India
May 2012
A Novel Blind Signature Scheme And Its Variation
Based on Discrete Logarithm Problem
A thesis submitted in partial fulllment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Technology
in
Computer Science and Engineering
(Specialization: Information Security)
by
Shubhanwita Sukhadarshini
(210CS2321)
under the guidance of
Prof. Sujata Mohanty
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
National Institute of Technology Rourkela
Rourkela-769 008, Orissa, India
May 2012
To my parents
Acknowledgment
Real knowledge is to know the extent of one's ignorance. - Confucius
The more I learn, the more is the need to learn and unlearn.
My humble and deep gratitude to those who have contributed in the completion
of this thesis.
This thesis has been the result of the untiring patience and guidance of my
advisor Prof.Sujata Mohanty, A true source of inspiration, she has been the key
reason for my sustained interest in the topic \A Novel Blind Signature And Its
Variation Based On Discrete Logarithm Problem".
My heartfelt thanks also goes to Prof.Sanjaya Kumar Jena and Saroj Pani-
grahy. Your kind words and unbiased views have always instilled in me the will
to quest for more.
My lab mates and batch mates have given me the right kind of support and
environment to grow intellectually and personally.
I thank all the members of the Department of Computer Science and Engi-
neering, and the Institute, who helped me by providing the necessary resources,
and in various other ways, in the completion of my work.
My family is the the backbone behind all my endeavours with their love and
support. No word of thanks can be enough for them for their encouragement,
support and belief in me.
My thanks and apologies to those whom I have inadvertently missed out.
Finally, I thank God for everything.
Shubhanwita Sukhadarshini
i
Abstract
Blind Signature is an addendum of Digital Signature.It is a two party protocol,in
which a requester sends a message to a signer to get the signature without revealing
the contents of the message to the signer. The signer puts the signature using
his/her private keys and the generated signature can be veried by anyone using
signer's public keys.Blind signature has a major property called as untraceability
or unlinkability i.e after the generation of the signature the signer cannot link the
message-signature pair. This is known as blindness property.
We have proposed blind signature scheme and its variation based on discrete
logarithm problem(DLP),in which major emphasis is given on the untraceability
property. We have cryptanalyzed Carmenisch et al.'s blind signature scheme and
Lee et al.'s blind signature scheme and proposed an improvement over it. It is
found that, the proposed scheme has less computational complexity and they can
withstand active attacks.
Blind signature has wide applications in real life scenarios , such as, e-cash,
e-voting and e-commerece applications.
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Introduction
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Digital Signature:
The digitization of paperwork has been a major leap in the eld of creation and
transfer of documents. Digital signature solves the major security concern for the
document. It is being a digital analog of handwritten signatures and is crucial for
identifying the the sender's identity and also whether the receiver has received it
tamper free [1]. The services provided by digital signature are:
 Message integrity
 Non-repudiation
 Authentication
But the big cons of digital signature come when the user needs to identify himself
during transactions like purchase (other than cash) or obtaining a service. This
breaches the privacy of the person in concern. Organizations now have massive
amounts of data, threatening these users' security. Taking it forward, where a
digital signature reveals the identity of the person in any transaction whereas a
Blind signature protects the sender's privacy and enables the user to get a signature
without giving the actual message to the signer.
1.1.2 Blind Signature:
Blind signature gives an answer here enabling the user to conduct e-transactions
securely and anonymously without jeopardizing his identity [1{3].It is a two party
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protocol consisting of a Signer and a group of Requesters.A requester requestes
the signer for a valid signature.Without knowing the details of the document, the
signer gives the signature using his/her private keys.The signature generated by
the signer is a blind signature.When the requester gets the blind signature,rst
it unblinds the signature, verify it by his/her keys and then reveal the message-
signature pair to the public.
1.1.3 Characteristics of Blind Signature
A blind signature protocol must satisfy the following basic properties [4, 5].
 Correctness: Any verier can check the correcteness of a signature by using
the signer's public keys.
 Authenticity: A valid signature indicates that the signer knowingly signed
the message.
 Unforgeability: A valid Signer can generate a valid signature for the message.
 Non-reusability: The signature requester can not use the signature more
than once.
 Non-repudiation: The signer can not disagree having signed a document
that has valid signature.
 Integrity: It says that the contents of the document have not been changed.
 Blindness: It says that while generating a valid signature,the signer is un-
aware of the message signed by him [6,7].
 Untraceability/Unlinkability: It says that when the requester publishes the
message-signature pair to the public, the signer cannot link the message with
the signature [1, 4, 8].
 Condentiality: No one except the authenticated usedr can modify the con-
tents of the message. [9]
Operations of a standard blind signature scheme is shown in g.1.1.
3
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Figure 1.1: Operation of a Blind Signature Scheme
1.1.4 Applications of Blind Signature
E-cash:
e-cash was introduced by David Chaum as an anonymous cash system [10].It is
interesting to know that ecoins are blind signatures.
e-cash is a three party protocol, in which a customer or the requester requests
for money withdrawal to his/her bank or the signer for buying products from the
merchant [11, 12].The signer veries the authenticity of the requester and then
sends signed tokens to the requester.The requester sends the tokens to the mer-
chant and the merchant give the token to the bank for verication of the tokens.
So we can see one transaction can give one valid token packet or one valid sig-
nature. For multiple transaction the corresponding signatures or the e-coins will
be dierent. But, nowadays many requester becomes malicious and spends the
e-coins for multiple times. This is known as the double spending problem.Though
blind signature provides untraceability or unlinkability but sometimes it is nec-
essary to reveal the identity of the requester.To do so,one requester should not
blind all the internal structure of the message.It should blind the outer part of
the message so that by using the public parameters the signer can able to trace
the identity of the malicious requester.This is kind of blind signature is known as
restrictive blind signature.
E-voting:
In a e-voting system [1,8,13{15], a voter rst registers himself/herself in a voting
system and then sends the blinded vote to the voting system.The voting system
then sends the vote to the ballot system.There it is veried whether the voter is
a registered or valid voter or not.If yes then the ballot center gives its signature
4
1.1 Introduction
on the vote envelope and send it to the counting system.So the ballot system
here gives his signature on the vote envelope without knowing the contents of
the envelope.This shows the blindness property. And when the vote is being
disclosed the ballot system will unable to link the signature and the vote to a
particular instance.This shows the untraceability or unlinkability property of the
blind signature.
1.1.5 Variations of Blind Signature
Restrictive Blind Signature:
Restrictive blind signature means that a requester can blind the documents but
with some restrictions. It is a protocol which says that any user can request for a
blind signature on a document form a valid signer. But it has certain limitations
as compared to the normal blind signature. Like normal blind signature the user
can blind the message in any way but the choice of the message is restricted and
must follow certain rules so that the original message and the blinded message
are isomorphic. [4, 5, 16, 17] The blind signature ensures that the signature gener-
ated by the signer for one transaction can only be used once.But if the requester
becomes malicious and tries to replay the signature again after some time dura-
tion then the identity of the requester should be revealed.This can be done by
applying restrictive blindness to the normal blind signature scheme.Revocable
Anonymity:
In any communication,protecting the contents is not enough.Sometimes it is re-
quired to keep the identity of the recipient as private.In the context of electronic
commerce,If no anonymity is provided then the users preferences can be known
.With this information anyone can know the prole of users and send them tar-
geted advertisements or can sell the proles to other commercial units. The buyer
will get problem by this as they want to do the transactions anonymously. Blind
signature allows a user to do any transactions anonymously. But in case of any
legal disputes e.g money laundering,the identity of the malicious user need to be
revealed.This is known as revocable anonymity i.e to revoke the anonymity when
needed [18,19,21,22].
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Fair Blind Siganture:
Though it is another variation of blind signature, it can be obtained from the
restrictive blind signature also.In a fair blind signature protocol a single trustee
or multiple trustees may get involved in the system.It is also used to revoke the
anonymity of malicious users and the trustte used to do that. To do so,the trustee
view all the parts of the blinding process [13,23]. For this reason the trustee need
to be remain online all the time, which compromises the eciency of the system.
Later many fair blind signatures [14, 15] are developed in which the trustee need
to keep a public-private key pair. The trustee can only involved in the tracing
protocol and by using the key pairs he can trace the identity of the malicious user.
Partial Blind Signature:
To achieve revocable anonymity,another variation of blind signature called as par-
tial blind signature is also used [5, 17].To trace the identity of the malicious user,
the signer need to keep some data in the databse during the transaction. This will
increase the space of the database. When the requester tries to use the signature
twice, the signer checks the database to identify that requester. But to search
the databse eachtime is not so feasible. Partial blind signature overcomes this
problem. In a partial blind signature protocol,the signer and the requester have
some common agreed information. The requester can blind the message but the
common agreed information need to be remain unblind. By using the common
information the signer can trace the identity of the requester when needed.The
concept of partial blind signature was developed by Abe and Okamato [17].
1.2 Motivation
The motivation for this project came from the growing need for a full proof sig-
nature verication scheme which can assure untraceability property , conditional
anonymity, maximum possible security from the existing schemes. The idea be-
hind the project is also to conrm that the proposed scheme can provide compa-
rable results and if possible better performance than already proposed signature
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verication schemes.
1.3 Related Work
Blind Signature was rst developed by David Chaum in 1982 [2, 9].He developed
the blind signature scheme based on factorization problem.He used the RSA sig-
nature schemes to implement the signature scheme.
David Chaum's Blind Signature Scheme
Let Bob ! the signature requester
Alice ! the signer
Alice: Signer
1. Chooses two prime numbers p and p and calculates n = p q.
2. She calculates (n) = (p  1)(q   1).
3. She chooses e as the public exponent and calculates d such that e  d =
1 mod (n).
4. She publishes (e; n) as the public keys and keeps d as the private key.
Figure 1.2: Operation of Chaum's Blind Signature Scheme
Bob: Requester
1. Bob chooses a message m to get signed.
2. He chooses k as the blinding factor to blind the message m.
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Here M 0: the blinded message
Sblind: the blind on blinded message
Sunblind: the signature on the actual message
Here the security of the signature scheme depends on the blinding factor k and
n.If somebody gets the blinding factor k and be able to factorize n then he/she
can get the valid signature from Bob pretending like an authenticated requester.
Blind signature provides sender's privacy at the time of any transactions. Any
blind signature scheme should satisfy the unforgeability property which says, ex-
cept the valid signer no one can produce a valid signature and if a message is
signed for multiple times then the corresponding signature will be dierent. The
signature produced in one transaction must be valid for one time only. If the
requester becomes malicious tries to use the signature twice then the identity of
the requester should be revealed. The above scenario can be well explained by an
example of e-cash where the blind signature is widely used. In an e-cash system
we know that e-coins are signed blindly. These are bit strings so it can be easily
copied and can be spent more than once by the requester. This is known as double
spending problem and this should be checked by the signer.
To overcome this problem Chaum developed on-line signature scheme in which
the bank or the signer check online whether the the e-coins are spent before or
not by checking its database online. But the main drawback is to check the
database online is time taking and not feasible enough. To overcome this, Chaum
and Pedersen proposed an o-line e-cash system in 1992 using RSA and factoring
problem [24]. The scheme proposed by them was able to identify the requester
who double spends the e-coins but it occurred after the fact. The scheme could
not prevent double spending rather it detects the double spender after the fact.
Here the bank used the cut-and-choose method to check whether the requester is
a malicious one or not. The bank signs many more e-coins for the user and later
ask the user randomly to specify the structure of some of the e-coin. If the user
fails to do that then the user is a malicious one.
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But the main drawback of this technique is that the workload between the user
and the signer increases and the space required to store all the information about
the e-coins also increases. Later many methodologies were developed without using
the cut-and-choose technique. The proposed schemes were based on factorization
problem but in case of factorization problem the security of the scheme lies on a
single number.
To overcome this problem Charmenisch et al. developed a new blind signature
scheme in 1994 based on the discrete logarithm problem [25]. Here the security
of the scheme lies in diculty in solving the discrete logarithm problem. But in
1995, Harn [22] pointed out that Charmenisch et al.'s scheme does not satisfy
the untraceability property of a blind signature scheme. In his cryptanalysis , he
pointed out that the signer in the Carmenisch et al.'s scheme can trace the blind
signature. By using all the public parameters used in a particular transaction and
the message signature pair revealed to the public by the requester, the signer can
trace the blind signature. Hoster [20] was complete disagreed with Harn and he
claimed that harn's cryptanalysis is wrong upon Cramenisch et al.'s scheme. He
explained that when the signer tries to trace the blind signature he will nd two
pairs of signature which satises the Harn's equations. So the signer cannot trace
blind signature generated by him. But later in Lee et al. [10]claimed that Hoster
cryptanalysis was wrong. Based on Harn's cryptanalysis Lee et al. state that any
signer can store all the relevant parameters when the requester requests for the
blind signature and can trace the owner of the signature . Lee et al. proposed
a scheme in 2005 in order to overcome the security limits of Carmenisch et al.'s
scheme. But in the same year Ting Wu and Jin-Rong Wang [26] pointed out
that though Lee et al.'s scheme satises the untraceability property, the proof
of untraceability is not correct and the cost of the scheme is higher than the
Carmenisch's scheme . So they proposed an improvement over the Lee et al.'s
scheme. But in 2007 Lin et al. [27] claimed that both of the schemes are not
secure enough to resist the attack proposed by them. Lin et al. design and
attack on both of the scheme and showed that any requester can get more than
9
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one valid signature by performing only one transaction which violates the security
requirement of blind signature. In Chapter 3 we have proposed an universal forgery
attack on Carmenisch et al.'s scheme and proved that by choosing some random
parameter anyone can forge a valid signature. Later many methodologies were
developed based on DLP .
Moreover, many variations of the blind signature scheme were found later
like fair blind signature [13, 16, 23], proxy blind signature [7, 28], partial blind
signature [17, 29], restrictive blind signature [29]. Among all these the restrictive
blind signature scheme proposed by Stefan Brand [30] was widely accepted in
the eld of e-cash. In literature many schemes are there and they satisfy the
untraceability property. But to satisfy the untraceability property with minimum
cost is most challenging. The schemes satisfying untraceability have to sacrice
either eciency or the security. Moreover, all the schemes can trace the identity
after the fact. Those schemes cannot prevent the double spending.
To overcome the above drawbacks Stefan Brand proposed a Untraceable o-
line restrictive blind signature scheme which can prevent double spending at a
minimum cost. This system is equally ecient as the online traceable system.But
in this thesis work we have proposed a DLP based blind signature scheme and
have proposed an improvement over the Lee et al.'s scheme to make this scheme
secured against the attack proposed by Lin et al..
1.4 Problem Statement
The objectives of this thesis are:
 To propose a DLP base blind signature scheme, resistant against universal
forgery attack.
 To propose some methodologies to prevent the attack proposed on Lee et
al.'s blind signature scheme by Lin et al.
1.5 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows.
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Chapter 2 describes the mathematics of cryptography. It describes the methods
required to generate the prime numbers, the methods to test the primality of a
number,the cryptographic hash functions to generate the message digest and the
basic building blocks of discrete logarithm problem.
Chapter 3 describes the proposed normal blind signature scheme and the Car-
menish et al.'s scheme [25].We have proposed an universal attack [31] on the
Carmenish et al.'s scheme.
Chapter 4 describes the Lee et al.'s blind signature scheme [10] and the pro-
posed improvement over it to prevent the attack proposed by Lin et al. [27].
11
Mathematics Of Cryptography
Discrete Logarithm Problem
Miller-Rabin Primality Test
Generation of Prime Numbers
Hash Fuctions
Chapter 2
Mathematics of Cryptography
2.1 Discrete Logarithm Problem
Discrete logarithms were used mainly in computations of nite elds and elliptic
curves. Discrete logarithm problem has signicant importance in the eld of cryp-
tography as the complexity lies in solving the discrete logarithm problem.In case
factorization problem,the security of the whole system lies on a single number n.If
the attacker can factorize the number n the it will break the security of the sys-
tem. Whereas, a discrete logarithm problem says it is very easy to compute a = gx
given x and g,where g is the public parameter and x is the private parameter, but
it is very dicult to compute x,given a and g,which are public parameters.Here g
is the primitive element and it is the element of a cyclic nite gorup [4].
Let G(q) is a group and G(q) is the multiplicative subgroup in which all the ele-
ments are having their multiplicative inverse.Here q is a prime number.An element
g is called as primitive element such that g 2 G(q) and it generates the cyclic mul-
tiplicative subgroup G(q) of the group G(q).Any elementa 2 G(q) = G(q)   0,
the discrete logarithm of a with respect to g is that integer x, 0  x  q   1, for
which a = gx.Here x = logag . The DLP is very easy to implement and it is used
mostly in E-cash system.
2.2 Miller-Rabin Primality Test
In the eld of cryptography prime numbers are mostly required. Many methods are
there to generate the prime numbers like Fermat's or Mersenne's or Safe prime
method. But if at any instance , these methods have failed to create a prime
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number then problems will arise. To overcome these problems, Cryptography
provides many primality testing methods. One of the methods that we have used
in our implementation part is Miller Rabin's primality test. Miller Rabin method
is a probabilistic algorithm. Miller Rabin primality test is the combination two
other probabilistic methods which are Fermat test and Square root test [4]. In
this method we write n-1 as the product of an odd number m and a power of
two. n   1 = m  2k As we know, the Fermat test in base a can be written as
an 1 = am2
k
= a[m] In the above step instead of calculating an 1 mod n in one
step, we are doing it in k+1 steps. The benet is square root test is performed in
each step. If at any step the square root test fails to satisfy then we declare the
number as composite.
2.3 Generating Prime Numbers
For generating prime numbers we have used Mersenne Prime method. It has the
formula Mp = 2
p   1. As per the formula if p is a prime number then Mp was
thought to be prime [4].
2.4 Hash Function
We need the one way hash function to generate the message digest of the mes-
sage. The message and the message digest is equivalent to a document and the
corresponding nger print. We calculate the message digest in order to achieve
message integrity. To create the message digest the message is passed through
a cryptographic hash function. There are many hash functions designed by Ron
Rivest. These hash functions are used to create the message digest. These are
referred to as MD2, MD4, MD5. MD stands for message digest. We have used
the MD5 hash function to create the message digest. MD5 takes the message as
the input and divides the message into blocks of 512 bits and creates a digest of
128 bits [4].
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Chapter 3
A Novel Blind Signature Scheme
Based On DLP
3.1 Introduction
Blind Signature is a two party protocol, in which a requestor sends a request to a
signer to give his signature on a message without knowing the message details and
a valid signer uses his secret key to sign the document. In order to forge a valid
signature, an attacker must know the secret key of the signer. Here we have rep-
resented a kind of universal forgery attack in which an attacker,without knowing
the secret key of the signer can forge a valid signature by selecting some random
parameters. We have developed the universal forgery attack on Carmenisch et
al.'s blind signature scheme. In this chapter,we have analyzed the possibilities
of forging the blind signature scheme and moreover, an improved blind signature
scheme is designed.The proposed scheme has been compared with Carmenisch et
al.'s blind signature scheme and found to have less computational complexity, less
execution time and resistivity against the universal forgery attack.
3.2 Review of Carmenish et al.'s Blind Signa-
ture Scheme
Let p; q be two large primes such that qjp   1, and g 2 Zp with order q. The
signer's secret and public keys are x 2 Zq, y = gxmod p respectively.
Carmenisch et al.'s scheme is listed as follows:
1. The signer randomly chooses k^ 2 Zq and computes r^ = gk^mod p, then he
16
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sends r^ to the requester.
2. The requester randomly chooses a; b 2 Zq and computes r = r^agbmod p,
then he blinds the message m by computing m^ = amr^r 1mod q. After that,
he transmits m^ to the signer.
3. The signer computes s^ = xr^ + k^m^ mod q and forwards it to the requester.
4. The requester derives s by computing s = s^rr^ 1 + bm mod q.
Finally, the requester gets the blind signature (r; s) of the message m, satis-
fying gs = yrrmmod p.
3.3 Universal Forgery attack on Carmenish et
al.'s Blind Signature Scheme
In this section, we followed the universal forgery attack developed by Baozheng,
Congwei [23].We applied the attack on Carmenisch et al.'s scheme to show that
the scheme is not secured enough to resist this attack. Let's assume that Eve is
an attacker. She can forge a valid signature pair (r1; s1) of M using the following
steps.
1. Chooses two random numbers a; b 2 Zq .
2. Computes r = ga
 1yb
3. Computes s =  a 1b 1ga 1yb
4. Computes m =  b 1ga 1yb
17
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Now. We show that (r1; s1) is a valid signature on the message M . As,
yrrm = yr(ga
 1
yb) b
 1ga
 1
yb
= yrg a
 1b 1ga
 1
yby bb
 1ga
 1
yb
= yrg a
 1b 1ga
 1
yby g
a 1yb
= yrg a
 1b 1ga
 1
yby r
= gs
From the above steps we can see that the random parameters (r1; s1) satises
the verication equation of Carmenisch et al.'s blind signature scheme. To avoid
this kind of attack, the solution is to use hash function in the blinding phase.So
the verication equation would look like gs = yrrh(m).It may be possible that
the attacker would choose the random parameter h(m) to satisfy the verication
equation but can never get the message M from h(M) as h(.) is a one way hash
function. Keeping the above point into consideration,we have proposed a blind
signature.
3.4 The Proposed Scheme
The proposed blind signature scheme consists of two parties, namely, a requester(R)
and a signer(S).The requester sends a message M in a blinded form to the signer
to get the signature.The signer generates the signature for the messageM without
knowing it's contents and sends the signature to the requester. After getting the
blinded signature from the signer, the requester unblinds it to get the original
signature for its message M . If we summarize the above steps then the scheme
consists of following ve phases: Key generation (for signer and the receiver), Set
up, Blinding, Signing process, Verifying and Unblinding.
Key generation: The signer randomly selects two distinct large prime numbers
p and q , a group generator g from which is a group of prime order q and computes
n = p  q. The signer selects a number x as the secret key from Zn and computes
y = gxmodn .Selects a random number w from Zn . The signer publishes n; g; y
18
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Figure 3.1: Operation of the Proposed Blind Signature Scheme
as the public key and keep x;w as the private key. The requester randomly selects
s; u; v from Zn and computes
I = gumodn (3.1)
The requester publishes I as the public key and keeps s; u; v as the private key.
In addition, let H be a public one-way hash function.
Set up: The signer computes z; b as per the following equations by using the
public key I of the requester.
z = Ixmodn (3.2)
b = Iwg modn (3.3)
The signer sends (z; b) to the requester.
Blinding Phase: The overall process of Proposed Scheme is shown in Fig.1.
The requester computes the following parameters.
C = H(Mkzkb) (3.4)
Cb = Cu
 1modn (3.5)
Then the requester sends the blinded message Cb to the signer.
Signing Phase: After receiving the parameter Cb from the requester, the signer
computes the signature r as follows.
r = (Cbx+ w)modn (3.6)
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The signer sends the signature r to the requester.
Verication and Unblinding Phase: When the requester gets the signature
r from the signer it veries the authenticity by checking the following condition.
(Irg) = ZCbbmodn (3.7)
If the above verication equation holds, then the requester unblinds the signature
by computing rb as per the following equation.
rb = (ru+ v)modn (3.8)
The (r; rb) is the signature on message M .
3.5 Security Analysis and Performance Evalua-
tion
In this section, we have analyzed the security of the proposed scheme and the
scheme is compared with the existing scheme [25].Moreover, it is veried that the
proposed scheme can withstand the universal forgery attack. Correctness of the
proposed scheme is also done. Also we have presented a comparative analysis in
terms of computational complexity.
3.5.1 Security Analysis
Correctness
The signature generated by the proposed scheme is indeed a valid one.
Proof:
Irg = (gu)rgmod n [As derived from eq.3.1]
= gu(Cbx+w)gmod n [As derived from eq.3.14]
= guCbxguwgmod n
= IxCbbmod n [As derived from eq.3.1, eq.3.3]
= zCbb mod n [As derived from eq.3.2] 2
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Theorem 1:The proposed scheme can withstand the blindness property.
Proof: The impaired vision of blind signature schemes ensures that the signer is
ignorant of the message M in the signing phase. In the proposed scheme, the
message M is also protected with the random number u in the signing phase as
shown is eq.[3.5]. The signer only knows the temporary variable Cb as shown is
eq.[3.5], but not the message M . The signer can't factor Cb to obtain M because
he does not know u.
Theorem 2:The signature generated by the proposed scheme is un-
traceable.
Proof: The term Untraceability indicates that the signer of the blind signature
is unable to link the message-signature pair after the same has been revealed to
the public. Here when the signer gives his signature on the blind message Cb,
it is encoded in a manner unknown to him. Incase the same encrypted set of
message and signature reaches him, he would not be able to identify whether it
was originally sent by him or not. This theorem shows that the proposed scheme
holds the untraceability property. Here as per the signers view the signature on the
message is r. But after getting the signature on the blind message, the requester
unblinds the signature and the message .So rb is the unblinded signature. As per
the eq.[3.6], the parameters Cb ,w are random. So for any two messages M1 and
M2, the value of Cb will be dierent and the value of w will also be dierent, as
a result, the value of r will be dierent. If the value of r is dierent for any two
messagesM1 andM2, then rb will be dierent as in eq.[3.8], (r; u; v) all are random.
So when the requester, after getting the actual signature rb on the original message
M , sends the message signature pair(M; rb) to the signer, then he will not be able
to recognize his own signature on the message as the value of r and rb must be
dierent.
Theorem 3:The proposed scheme withstands the forgeability attack.
Proof: The adversary can never forge the signature of the signer. From all the
public parameters n; g; z; b; y provided by the signer , it is possible to nd out
the secret key w; x of the signer as shown in eq.[3.2,3.3].The adversary cannot
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compute x from publicly available parameters y and z as it is equals to solve the
discrete logarith problem.Similarly, from the publicly available parameter b, the
adversary cannot compute the secret key w.So,for an adversary,it's very dicult
to get the secret keys from the publicly available parameters, as the security lies
in the complexity of solving discrete logarithm problem. Until and unless he gets
the secrete keys x;w of the signer he can never forge the signature r of the signer
as shown in eq.[3.6].
Denition 1: Universal forgery attack: The unforgeability property of blind
signature protocol says that, except a valid signer no one can generate a valid
signature.A valid Signer can only produce the valid signature by using his/her
private keys.So,to forge a signature,the private key of the signer is required. But
in case of universal forgery attack [23] anyone can generate a valid signature with-
out using the private keys of the signer and can reveal the message contents of the
requester.In this attack any attacker can produce a valid signature by choosing
some random parameters satisfying the verication equation.
Theorem 4:The Proposed scheme can withstand the universal forgery
attack.
Proof: In this scheme we are blinding the message digest C rather than the message
M itself. Though by selecting some random parameters, the attacker Eve can forge
the signature but she can never get the message M as here we have used the one
way hash function in creating the digest of the message.
3.5.2 Performance Evaluation:
The computational complexity of any cryptographic algorithm mainly depends
upon on four major operations, namely, number of inverse operation, number of
hash function, number of exponential and number of multiplication operation.
Ignoring the time for performing addition and subtraction operation in the anal-
ysis process, the following notations are used to analyze the performance of the
proposed scheme with comparison to the existing scheme.
 TE is the time complexity of modular exponentiation
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 TM is the time complexity of multiplication
 TH is the time complexity of hash function
 TI is the time complexity of inverse function
Phases Carmenisch et al.'s Scheme
[25]
Proposed Scheme
Key generation and
set up 2TE 3TE
Blinding TI + 4TM + 2TE TI + TH + TM
Signing 2TM TM
Verication 3TE + TM 2TE + 2TM
Unblinding 3TM + TI TM
Table 3.1: Computational complexity analysis
In the proposed scheme the requester sends a le M which contains the message,
to the signer to get the signature r for it. We have compared various phases
of the proposed scheme with Carmenisch et al.'s scheme [25] and the compared
performance evaluation is shown in table 3.1.
From Table 3.1, it is clear that the proposed scheme consists of minimum no.
of operations. Hence the computation cost of the proposed scheme is much less.
3.6 Chapter Summery
This Chapter summerizes, if a requester wants to get the signature on its message
M without revealing the contents of the message to the signer,then he/she can
get that. The scheme proposed in this Chapter,consists of less computational
complexity. It would be a better alternative for some organizational operations,
as through this, the security requirements of integrity, condentiality, authenticity,
and non-repudiation can be simultaneously achieved with low computation and
communication cost. This scheme can be applicable to real life scenarios such as
e-commerce applications.
23
An Improvent Over Lee et al.'s Scheme
Introduction
Review of Lee-Hwang-Yang blind signature scheme
Review of the attack proposed by Lin et al.s on Lee et al.s blind signature scheme
Proposed Methodologies
Chapter Summery
Chapter 4
An Improvement Over Lee et
al.'s Scheme
4.1 Introduction
In 2005, Lee et al. proposed a blind signature scheme, satisfying the two basic
properties of blind signature, which are blindness and untraceability. An improved
and simplied version of the Lee et al.'s scheme [10] was proposed by Wu and
Wang [26]. In 2008, Lin et al., proposed an attack [27] on both Lee et al.'s and
Wu and Wang's scheme and showed that both of the schemes are not secure. They
designed an attack on both the schemes such that a signature requester can obtain
two dierent valid signatures for two dierent messages from one transaction,
which contravene the security of the blind signature. In this chapter, we proposed
some methodologies through which the signer can prevents the signature requester
from getting more than one valid signatures by performing only one round of the
protocol.
4.2 Review of Lee-Hwang-Yang Blind Signature
Scheme
In this section we briey review the blind signature proposed by Lee et al.'s [10].
The scheme consists of two parties namely the signer and a group of signature
requester. The requester requests the signer to get a signature on the message m.
Here the signer is unaware of the message contents which satises the blindness
property of a blind signature. The details of the Lee et al.'s scheme is given below.
Initially the signer chooses two large prime numbers p and q where qj(p 1) and a
generator g of order q from Zp . The signer selects an integer x and keeps it as the
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secrete key. The signer computes y = gxmod p and publishes it along with p; q; g
as the public key. The signer chooses four random numbers (k^1; k^2; b1; b2) from Zq
and computes r^1 = g
k^1 mod p; r^2 = g
k^2 mod p such that GCD(r^i; q) = 1.
The signer sends the parameters (r^1; r^2; b1; b2) to the requester. When the re-
quester receives (r^1; r^2; b1; b2) from the signer, he chooses ve random numbers(a; b; c; d; e)
and keeps them as the secret parameters. The requester then computes r =
(r1r2)
dmod p where r1 = r^1
ab1gcmod p and r2 = r^2
bb2gemod p. Then the re-
quester blinds the message m by computing m^1 = mr^1r
 1=2 ad mod q and m^2 =
mr^2r
 1=2 bd mod q and sends (m^1; m^2) to the signer. After getting the parameters
(m^1; m^2) from the requester, the signer computes the corresponding signature s^1
and s^2 for (m^1; m^2) as follows and sends (s^1; s^2)to the requester.
s^1 = xr^1 + k^1b1m^1mod q (4.1)
s^2 = xr^2 + k^2b2m^2mod q (4.2)
When the requester receives the parameters (s1; s2) from the signer, he computes
the signature s as follows.
s1 = s^1r^1
 1r=2 + cdmmod q (4.3)
s2 = s^2r^2
 1r=2 + edmmod q (4.4)
s = (s1 + s2)mod q (4.5)
Then the requester publishes (m; r ; s) to the public. One can verify the triplet
by checking the verication equation gs  yrrmmod p.
4.3 Review of the attack proposed by Lin et al.'s
on Lee et al.'s Blind Signature Scheme
Form the cryptanalysis of Lee et al.'s blind signature scheme, Lin et al. concluded
that, if the requester becomes malicious, he/she can sends two dierent messages
m,m to get two dierent signatures s1,s2 from the signer respectively by per-
forming only one transaction [27]. The proposed attack is described below.
Instead of computing r1 = r^1
ab1gcmod p and r2 = r^2
bb2gemod p and r = (r1r2)
d
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in the scheme of section 2, the requester computes r1 = (r
ab1
1 g
c)dmod p and
r2 = (r2
bb2ge)dmod p as he doesn't need r in the attack. The requester then
computes m^1 = mr^1r
 1
1 admod q and m^2 = m r^2r
 1
2 bdmod q and sends (m1;m2)
to the signer. The signer computes s1; s2 and sends it to the requester.
s^1 = xr^1 + k^1b1m^1mod q (4.6)
s^2 = xr^2 + k^2b2m^2mod q (4.7)
Then the requester computes
s1 = s^1r^1
 1r1 + cdmmod q (4.8)
s2 = s^2r^2
 1r2 + edm mod q (4.9)
By doing this the requester gets two message signature pairs (m; r1; s1) and
(m; r2; s2), satisfying two verication equations g
s1  yr1r1m mod p and gs2 
yr2r2
m mod p.
4.4 Proposed Methodology
In Lee et al.'s Scheme the requester sends (m^1; m^2) to the signer, where m^1,m^2
are the blinded form the same message contents m .Here only the blinding process
is dierent for them. The requester does this, just to check the message integrity.
When the signer gets these two parameters m^1,m^2 form the requester, he sends
two dierent signatures s^1,s^2 to the requester as shown in eq[5.6 and 5.7]. The
motive behind sending two blinded form of the message to the signer may be to
check whether the message contents from these two signature is same or not. If
a requester becomes malicious and sends two dierent message in two dierent
blinded form to the signer, then it is the duty of the signer to recognize that and
if he nds that the requester have used two dierent message contents in m^1 and
m^2 then he simply dismiss the transaction.
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Case I:
To do so, the signer can add one authentication equation of the message after
when he gets the m^1,m^2 parameters from the requester.
As we know,
m^1 = mr^1r
 1=2 ad mod q (4.10)
m^2 = mr^2r
 1=2 bd mod q (4.11)
from the above two equations one can derive m as follows.
m = m^1r^1
 1r=2(ad) 1mod q (4.12)
m = m^2r^2
 1r=2(bd) 1mod q (4.13)
From the above two equations, the signer knows the parameters (r1; r2;m1;m2)
only (r; a; b; d) are unknown to him.
Let the signer replaces,
r1=2(ad)
 1 = c1
and
r2=2(bd)
 1 = c2
So the eq[4.12 and 4.13] become
m = m^1r^1
 1c1mod q (4.14)
m = m^2r^2
 1c2mod q (4.15)
For some set of values of (c1; c2) the eq.[4.14 and 4.15] will be same if the message
contents is same for m^1 and m^1 as per Lee et al.'s scheme described in section 4.2.
So the signer can add the following authentication equations,once he receives the
parameters (m^1; m^2) to check the message integrity.
m = m^1r^1
 1c1mod q
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m = m^2r^2
 1c2mod q
As per Lin et al.'s scheme described n section 3.3
m^1 = mr^1r1
 1 ad mod q
m^2 = m r^2r2
 1 bd mod q
So,
m = m^1r1
 1r1 (ad) 1 mod q (4.16)
m = m^2r2
 1r2 (bd) 1 mod q (4.17)
From the above two equations, the signer knows the parameters (r1; r2; m^1; m^2)
only. r1; r2; a; b; d are unknown to him.
Let the signer replaces,
r1=2(ad)
 1 = c1
and
r2=2(bd)
 1 = c2
So the eq.[4.16 and 4.17] become
m = m^1r1
 1c1mod q (4.18)
m = m^2r2
 1c2mod q (4.19)
For some set of values of (c1; c2) the eq.[4.18 and 4.19] will never be same if the
message contents is not same for m^1 and m^2 as per Lin et al.'s scheme described
in section 4.3.
So, here the parameters (m^1; m^2) will fail to satisfy the authentication equations
[4.12 and 4.13 ]sets by the signer. So the signer will dismiss the transaction.
29
4.5 Chapter Summery
4.5 Chapter Summery
In this chapter we have veried that the attack proposed by Lin et al.'s on Lee
et al.'s scheme can be prevented. If a requester becomes malicious and tries to
get two valid signatures for two dierent messages from one transaction, then the
signer can prevent this by checking the authentication equations or by giving only
one signature s for (m^1; m^2) instead of giving two signatures s1 and s2 as in Lee
et al.'s scheme.
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Conclusion and Future Work
The proposed blind signature schemes are indeed valid ones as they satisfy the
blindness, unlinkability and unforgeablity property. The proposed schemes are
more secure than the normal blind signature scheme as one of the scheme is re-
sistant against the universal forgery attack and the other one is resistant against
the attack proposed by Lin et al. on Lee et al..As the proposed schemes satises
the untaceability and blindness propoerty, it can be widely used in real life sce-
narios like e-commerce applications and online bidding. The proposed scheme can
further be implemented in dierenet variations of blind signature as proxy blind
signature,restrictive blind signature, fair blind signature, partial blind signature,
restrictive partial blind signature and so on.
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